Cooperation in prisoners' dilemma
In: European Journal of Political Economy, Band 9, Heft 4, S. 567-579
386 Ergebnisse
Sortierung:
In: European Journal of Political Economy, Band 9, Heft 4, S. 567-579
The choice between quantity and price in order to stabilize collusion is modeled here. It is shown that this relocates the prisoners' dilemma backwards, from the market stage to the stage where the market variable is chosen in order to sustain collusion, and where discount rates appear as the payo¤s. Likewise, a prisoners' dilemma arises also when both the market variable and the type of behavior (cooperative or non-cooperative) are simultaneously chosen.
BASE
In: Journal of ethnic and migration studies: JEMS, Band 18, Heft 2, S. 229-249
ISSN: 1469-9451
In: New community: European journal on migration and ethnic relations ; the journal of the European Research Centre on Migration and Ethnic Relations, Band 18, Heft 2, S. 229-249
ISSN: 0047-9586
In: Journal of policy analysis and management: the journal of the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management, Band 15, Heft 4, S. 646-653
ISSN: 0276-8739
In: The journal of conflict resolution: journal of the Peace Science Society (International), Band 19, Heft 4, S. 596-612
ISSN: 1552-8766
The relationship between Newcomb's problem, which involves an apparent paradox of prediction, and Prisoners' Dilemma is explicated. After describing a resolution to Newcomb's problem, due to John A. Ferejohn, that renders the two contradictory principles of choice in Newcomb's problem (dominance and expected utility) consistent, I show Prisoners' Dilemma to be a "symmetricized" version of Newcomb's problem in its payoff structure. The assumption about predictability of choice made for one player in Newcomb's problem, when applied to both players in Prisoners' Dilemma–one considered as a leader and the other as a follower–offers a resolution to this dilemma that, while consistent with the resolution offered by metagame theory, rationalizes the existence of a metagame solution within a probabilistic, rational-choice framework. The relevance of the mutual-predictability assumption to the solution of arms races, and tragedy-of-commons situations generally, is discussed.
In: Conflict: an international journal for conflict and policy studies, Band 7, Heft 4, S. 365-377
ISSN: 0149-5941
World Affairs Online
In: Eastern economic journal: EEJ, Band 35, Heft 2, S. 137-143
ISSN: 1939-4632
SSRN
Working paper
In: Synthese: an international journal for epistemology, methodology and philosophy of science, Band 55, Heft 3, S. 347-352
ISSN: 1573-0964
SSRN
Working paper
In: Discussion Papers / Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung, Forschungsschwerpunkt Markt und Entscheidung, Abteilung Ökonomik des Wandels, Band SP II 2013-311
We use a novel experimental design to identify the subjects' strategies in an infinitely repeated prisoners' dilemma experiment. We ask subjects to design strategies that will play in their place. We find that eliciting strategies has negligible effects on their behavior, supporting the validity of this method. We find the chosen strategies include some common ones such as Tit-For-Tat and Grim trigger. However, other strategies that are considered to have desirable properties, such as Win-Stay-Lose-Shift, are not prevalent. We also find that the strategies used to support cooperation change with the parameters of the game. Finally, our results confirm that long-run miscoordination can arise. (author's abstract)
SSRN
Working paper
In: Behavioral science, Band 16, Heft 5, S. 472-481
In: Synthese: an international journal for epistemology, methodology and philosophy of science, Band 86, Heft 2, S. 173-196
ISSN: 1573-0964